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In modern corporate ownership structure, using pyramid ownership structure, 
multiple control chains and dual-class shares, the ultimate controlling shareholder can 
own the control rights of a company with a low cash-flow rights. On one hand, the 
widespread divergences between the control and cash-flow rights can improve the 
resource allocation efficiency within the enterprise groups. On the other hand, the high 
control rights enable the ultimate controlling shareholders to engage in various self-
dealing activities to diver corporate resources for private benefit while the low cash-
flow rights expose the ultimate controlling shareholders to very limited direct financial 
cost of such activities. The agency cost between the ultimate controlling shareholders 
and the minority shareholders, known as Type Ⅱ agency cost, is one of the main 
topics in China. 
Traditional theories on capital structure focus on the choice between equity 
financing and debt financing and ignore the heterogeneity of debt financing. The choice 
between public debt, which includes corporation bonds, Medium Term Note and Short-
term financing bond, and private debt, which is mainly bank loan, is known as the 
placement structure of debt. On one hand, compared to public debt holders, banks have 
significant comparative advantages in monitoring efficiency due to access to private 
information as insiders. Superior access to information enables banks to detect 
expropriation or opportunistic activities by controlling shareholders and corporate 
insiders and, accordingly, to punish the offending borrowers either by liquidation or 
through renegotiation. In contrast, the diffuse ownership of public debt and the resulting 
free rider problems weaken individual bondholders’ incentives to engage in costly 
monitoring. In short, the combination of concentrated holdings, credible threats, and 
superior access to information makes banks much more effective monitors than public 
bondholders in deterring potential self-interested or self-dealing activities. 
On the basis of the previous analysis, we investigate the impact of the ultimate 
















from the idea that the ultimate controlling shareholder may choose public debt 
financing over bank debt financing as a way of avoiding scrutiny and insulating 
themselves from bank monitoring. 
Based on the data of A-Share listed companies on both Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock markets from 2008 to 2015, we find that the ultimate controlling shareholder’s 
excessive control right has a significant negative impact on the proportion of bank debt 
and a significant positive impact on the proportion of public debt, which is consistent 
with the hypothesis that ultimate controlling shareholder with excessive control right 
choose public debt financing over bank debt as a way of avoiding scrutiny and 
insulating themselves from bank monitoring. 
In another set of tests, we investigate whether state-owned and the level of cash 
holdings affect the relationship between excessive controlling right and the placement 
structure of debt. Due to the soft budget constraint, it’s possible that for firms owned 
by state, the placement structure of debt may be less sensitive to the ultimate controlling 
shareholder’s excessive controlling right. As the agency problems are particularly acute 
for firms with high level of cash holding, it’s possible that for firms with high level of 
cash holdings, the placement structure of debt may be more sensitive to the ultimate 
controlling shareholder’s excessive controlling right. Indeed, we find that the effects of 
ultimate controlling shareholder’s excessive controlling right on the placement 
structure of debt is more pronounced when the firms is state-owned or the firm’s level 
of cash holdings is relatively high. 
In addition to the effects of ultimate controlling shareholder’s excessive 
controlling right on the placement structure of debt, we also explore the impact of 
excessive controlling right on firm value. As has been widely shown in the literature, 
we find that the ultimate controlling shareholder’s excessive controlling right has a 
negative impact on firm value. Compared with public debt, bank monitoring can reduce 
the moral hazard problems and provide borrowers strong incentives to make appropriate 
corporate decision. As a consequence, we find that the proportion of bank financing can 
weaken the negative impact of the ultimate controlling shareholder’s excessive 















negative impact. To take the level of cash holdings into consideration, we spilt the 
sample into firms with high level of cash holdings and firms with low level of cash 
holdings and repeat the regression. In firms with high level of cash holdings, we 
continue to find that the proportion of bank financing can weaken and the proportion 
of public debt can strengthen the negative impact of the ultimate controlling 
shareholder’s excessive controlling right on firm value. 
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CSMAR 数据库中上市公司 2015 年年报数据显示，海螺型材（股票代码：




期银行借款期末余额高达 123.94 亿元，占公司负债总额的 95.48%，并且公司没

























自 La Porta 等（1999）[6]以来，一系列的研究表明，除了英、美等国之外，
股权集中现象在世界范围内广泛存在，上市公司普遍受终极控股股东的控制









2010[17]）、关联交易（Bertrand 等，2002[18]；Bae 等，2002[19]；Cheung 等，2006[20]；
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